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This Article identifies the drastic differences in implementation 
and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention norms.  
Since its adoption and entry into force in 1999, the international 
community and parties to the Convention still struggle with 
combatting foreign bribery.  The United States is a leader in 
implementation through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but 
other nations do not have similar domestic statutes and rigor in 
enforcement or adequate administrative structures for mutual legal 
assistance or penalties.  This Article provides an introduction to the 
United States and International efforts to curb acts of bribery, 
provides an overview of the norms and mechanisms for 
enforcement under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and then 
analyzes the actual progress of selected G20 nations by examining 
the most recent Phase 3 peer-review reports and any follow-up 
recommendations.  This data indicates that there are countries with 
high enforcement, moderate enforcement, and little or no 
enforcement.  To better discourage foreign bribery in the future, 
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OECD countries should provide more uniform and longer domestic 
statute of limitations, clear implementing legislation like the FCPA 
in the United States, national procedures for investigating bribery 
and coordinating administrative bodies, whistleblower protection, 
and more severe national penalties and confiscation of bribery 
funds.  This will capture the spirit of the Convention and pave the 
way for more uniformity in deterring foreign bribery. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is the premier statute 
in the United States to address the nefarious conduct of foreign 
corrupt payments to foreign officials, foreign political parties, or 
candidates for political office in order to influence any act of that 
foreign official and to secure any improper advantage in order to 
obtain business.1  Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act 
is divided between the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for civil and 
criminal authority over all covered persons under the Act, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for civil and 
administrative authority over all issuers.2  Historically, the United 
States has been a beacon for enforcement of foreign corrupt 
payments within the international community.3  In December 1997, 
twenty-eight out of twenty-nine countries who were members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (the “Anti-Bribery Convention”).  These 
signatories included the United States, and this international 
convention reflected the hard work of the United States while 
championing the draft of international legal standards for foreign 
bribery.4  All of the nations that ratified the OECD Convention have 
been complying with the Anti-Bribery Convention by enacting 
domestic legislation that prohibits transnational bribery.5  The 
United States enacted the changes to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act in 1998 to align with the broader OECD standards of proscribing 
payments to secure an “improper advantage” and expanded the 
jurisdictional scope of the Act to apply to foreign persons.6  Yet, since 
                                                             
 1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et. seq. 
 2 See id. at § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (“An officer or employee of a foreign government 
or any instrumentality will qualify as a foreign official”). 
 3 See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 
1–45 (2014) (providing a history of and rationale for the FCPA). 
 4 See Id. 
 5 See Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/H6C2-UJJJ] (listing the four phases of its 
peer-review monitoring system). 
 6 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-366, § 2, 112 Stat. 3302 (modifying 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(A), 78dd-2(a)(1)(A), 
78dd-3(a)(1)(A)). 
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the OECD Convention was signed and implemented by various 
parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention, there have been varying 
success stories with domestic enforcement.  For example, a weak 
legal system in an OECD nation and subpar domestic legal 
enforcement mechanisms may lead to few sanctions or domestic 
review of these economic crimes in the international business 
market. 
This Article will first analyze the goals and mandates of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions since its entry 
into force in 1999.  Then, it will analyze the relative dearth of 
enforcement or settlements for bribery violations by some OECD 
countries who have ratified the Convention as juxtaposed to the 
more vigorous prosecutions and penalties in other OECD countries.  
More specifically, the Article will highlight OECD nations that are 
falling behind in anti-bribery efforts according to the recent OECD 
Working Group’s reports (“Phase 3” OECD reports7).  Third, the 
Article will provide analysis of case studies of several nations that 
are meeting or exceeding their OECD anti-corruption obligations as 
a normative standard.  Finally, the Article will conclude with a 
proposal for increased international cooperation and mutual legal 
assistance to align with OECD goals and international anti-bribery 
norms while also recognizing the United States as a leader in 
enforcement and prosecutions.  This proposal will also consider the 
need for uniformity in OECD implementation and its associated 
anti-bribery norms on a global scale as an aspiration for 
international business dealings in a global economy. 
2.  OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB 
BRIBERY 
International corruption has historically existed in a variety of 
forms.  Nations, both through their public officials and business 
                                                             
 7 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/M95C-ACM6] (providing access to 
individual countries’ monitoring reports and the 2017-18 timetable for peer reviews 
and follow-up reports). 
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traditions or governmental entities, often facilitate corrupt actions 
by foreigners.  Unscrupulous business incentives have often been 
used to encourage companies to seek out business and trade in 
foreign nations in lieu of favoring more legitimate business 
developments or international business transactions in their own 
jurisdiction.8  Today’s global business corruption affects the 
international marketplace and creates an opening for crimes of 
many kinds that weaken the international business terrain.9  These 
nefarious effects include criminal networks for narcotics, terrorism, 
human traffickers, cybercrimes, and many other globally harmful 
acts.10 
The United States spearheaded the international anti-corruption 
movement after the Watergate scandal put international corruption 
in the spotlight in the 1970s.11  Until the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (“FCPA”) passed in 1977, after illegal payments to foreign 
officials were uncovered, the United States had not adequately 
addressed foreign corrupt practices in the context of extraterritorial 
business.12  The Watergate scandal uncovered a myriad of bribery 
                                                             
 8 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Fight against Corruption, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L. (Sept. 2009), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e918 [https://perma.cc/8VNK-C2WV] (identifying various illicit 
business practices that encourage companies to engage in business transactions in 
foreign jurisdictions).  See also generally KOEHLER, supra note 3. 
 9 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: WAYS TO ENHANCE 
THE WORLD BANK’S (2006) (noting that foreign corruption undermines the 
international marketplace).  See also generally Roger P. Alford, A Broken Windows 
Theory of International Corruption, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1253 (2012) (arguing that 
international corruption signals the breakdown of the necessary community 
controls for general welfare). 
 10 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (TI), EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS 
REPORT 2015: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING 
FOREIGN BRIBERY (2015) (reporting that foreign corruption has diverse and far-
reaching consequences).  See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant 
Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks Highlighting Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement at the George Washington University Law 
School (Nov. 3, 2016) (asserting that foreign corruption “is far more harmful than 
can be measured numerically” due to its wide-ranging consequences). 
 11 Abiola O. Makinwa, Researching Civil Remedies for International Corruption: 
The Choice of the Functional Comparative Method, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 331, 332 (2009) 
(“[T]he Watergates scandal in the United States led to the passage of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).”) (citation omitted). 
 12 See KOEHLER, supra note 3, at 1–19. 
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payments by U.S. businesses to foreign public officials.13  In 
historically uncharted territory, the United States addressed the 
illegal, including criminal, activities that businesses should not 
undertake when conducting international business in other 
nations.14  Few prosecutions ensued from the FCPA in its early years 
because the anti-bribery statutory language was unclear to the DOJ 
and SEC in the 1980s and 1990s.15  The 1998 amendments to the 
FCPA implemented the treaty obligations of the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention.16  With this 1998 revision, the DOJ and SEC 
then began to more vigorously prosecute FCPA violations for 
facilitating procurement of business deals in foreign jurisdictions 
through bribes or other payments to public officials.17 
Since 1998, the DOJ has increased prosecution of FCPA 
violations, making the United States the leader in foreign corrupt 
practices enforcement.18  Two recent cases highlight this recent vigor 
in prosecution, which often leads to settlement.  During the Wal-
Mart scandal in Mexico in 2011 involving illegal payments made to 
facilitate store openings in the country, the DOJ was at the forefront 
of foreign corrupt practices exposure because a major U.S. corporate 
entity revealed bribery violations in conjunction with foreign 
business expansion.19  After investigating Wal-Mart’s business 
                                                             
 13 See Id. 
 14 See Id. 
 15 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: 
Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285 (2007) (identifying 
recent controversial FCPA cases and discussing particular FCPA provisions). 
 16 S. REP. NO. 105-277 (1998).  See also Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 19, 1997, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 1 (establishing legally binding standards to 
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions). 
 17 These are mainly bribery cases under Section 78dd-2 of the FCPA.  See FCPA 
Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions 
[https://perma.cc/PS6N-X8MU] (listing enforcement actions from 1977 to 
present); Department of Justice, Opinion Releases Index, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/opinion-releases-index 
[https://perma.cc/27FP-SQNA] (listing released FCPA opinions from 1980-2014). 
 18 See generally KOEHLER, supra note 3, at 169–233. 
 19 See generally Miguel Bustillo & Joe Palazzolo, Wal-Mart Discloses a Corruption 
Probe, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203501304577086933145615936 
[https://perma.cc/QN75-CSV6] . 
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practices in several countries including the original location of new 
Wal-Mart stores in Mexico, a settlement was reached in 2016 for at 
least USD 600 million.20  And, in January 2017, Rolls-Royce admitted 
to the DOJ that it bribed government officials in several countries in 
exchange for government contracts in violation of the FCPA, leading 
to a USD 170 million settlement.21  Rolls-Royce also agreed to a 
cumulative USD 800 million global settlement with U.S., UK, and 
Brazilian authorities.22  Between 2000 and 2013, Rolls-Royce paid 
more than USD 35 million in bribes to foreign officials through third 
parties.23  The Rolls Royce and Wal-Mart settlements are prime 
examples of the DOJ’s integral role of leading international anti-
bribery enforcements mechanisms under the FCPA since the 1998 
revisions to the Act. 
Outside the United States and the FCPA enforcement actions, 
there have also been concerted efforts to curb bribery on a global 
scale by other G20 nations.  The main international business treaty 
that governs international anti-bribery is the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.24  Over thirty-five nations are parties to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention terms, which reveals substantial agreement in 
the international community toward combatting bribery since the 
Anti-Bribery Convention’s signature in 1997 and entry into force in 
1999.25  The parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention include many of 
the G20 nations where corruption still persists in international 
                                                             
 20 Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, Wal-Mart Balks at Paying $600-Million-
Plus in Bribery Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/wal-mart-said-to-balk-
at-paying-600-million-plus-in-bribe-case [https://perma.cc/BH7S-GTRM]. 
 21 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rolls-Royce Agrees to Pay $170 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170-million-
criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/P8VW-
JWS2].  See also Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, supra note 20 (reporting the same 
figure). 
 22 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 21. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
supra note 7 (listing parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and reports from 
each country on implementation efforts). 
 25 See, e.g., Data on enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/data-on-enforcement-of-the-anti-
bribery-convention.htm [https://perma.cc/587Y-8WV3] (summarizing worldwide 
enforcement actions under the Anti-Bribery Convention). 
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business dealings based on inconsistent measures to implement the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention into national legal landscapes and 
business climates.26  Numerous international business partners of 
the United States, though, are falling behind in the fight against 
international foreign corrupt business practices based on the current 
lack of prosecutions and domestic implementation of the OECD 
norms, especially when juxtaposed against the U.S. vigor.27  
According to an Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Criminal 
Division, “corruption is far more harmful than can be measured 
numerically . . . when corruption takes hold, the fundamental notion 
of playing by the rules gets pushed to the side, and individuals, 
businesses and governments instead begin to operate under a 
fundamentally unfair—and destabilizing—set of norms.”28  The 
Assistant Attorney General explained that international business 
corruption undermines confidence in the international markets and 
governments and “destroys the sense of fair play.”29  The harm to 
the international business “fair play” norms is significant as the 
World Bank estimates that more than USD 1 trillion is paid each year 
in bribes, amounting to approximately three percent of the world’s 
economy.30 
Anti-corruption, including anti-bribery efforts, is also generally 
available on an international scale with the entry into force of the 
                                                             
 26 See, e.g., OECD, OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME 
OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS (2014) (revealing that foreign bribery persists in 
some of the G20 nations, such as Argentina, France, and Japan, because of the 
prevalence of payments to facilitate public procurement of contracts in foreign 
jurisdictions where this practice is the cultural norm). 
 27 See generally OECD, 2015 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION (Nov. 2016) (showing that a majority of parties to the Anti-Bribery 
Convention have not sanctioned a single party since the treaty came into effect). 
 28 Dep’t of Justice, supra note 21. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Issue Paper on Corruption and Economic Growth 5 (2013), OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/Issue-Paper-Corruption-
and-Economic-Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T6A-4WDL] (“A widely quoted 
estimate by the World Bank(2013) [sic] puts the total amount of bribes paid in both 
developing and developed countries in 2001/2002 at 1 trillion dollars, about 3 % of 
world GDP at the time.”).  See also OECD, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASURING OECD RESPONSES (2014) (discussing progress in 
halting illicit financial flows and shortcomings of OECD nations in dealing with 
illicit flows). 
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United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005.31  This is a 
treaty involving many G20 nations who are attempting to combat 
global corruption.  With 140 signatories and over 180 parties to this 
United Nations (“UN”) agreement, the UN Convention provides for 
increased cooperation among countries to combat global corruption 
in a wide variety of criminal settings, including bribery in 
international business.32  A recent OECD chart summarizes the 
dramatic increase in foreign bribery cases per year based on 
international efforts since 1999.33  Beginning with only one case in 
1999, the current number of concluded cases per year ranges 
between forty to eighty cases since 2008.34  This highlights the 
continued widespread prevalence of international bribery and 
should be a disturbing statistic, considering the number of cases that 
are presumably never brought against international multinational 
enterprises that continue to make bribery payments.35 
3.  THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION:  AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
NORMS AND MECHANISMS FOR THEIR ENFORCEMENT 
The United States paved the way for comprehensive anti-bribery 
efforts with the FCPA and advocated for the establishment of 
international anti-bribery norms with other nations.36  The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention was signed in 1997 and entered into force 
                                                             
 31 See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
 32 Signature and Ratification Status, UNODC, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 
[https://perma.cc/WEW3-NU9C]. 
 33 OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 27.  See also Roberto A. Ferdman, How the world’s 
biggest companies bribe foreign governments—in 11 charts, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/03/how-the-
worlds-biggest-companies-bribe-foreign-governments-in-11-
charts/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6ab1039c235f [https://perma.cc/96TR-72GF] 
(exploring the spread of bribes between corporations and national governments 
and indicating what sort of officials and industries are implicated in bribes). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The 
OECD Antibribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012) (discussing the development 
of multilateral enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention). 
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on February 15, 1999.  Currently, there are forty-four countries that 
are bound by the Anti-Bribery Convention as signatories, and those 
nations are entering Phase 4 of the Convention’s monitoring process 
this year.37  Phase 4 review (December 2016–June 2024) continues to 
monitor the effectiveness of the national legislative frameworks and 
OECD nations’ follow-through on the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention enforcement.  This is a regular review procedure by 
independent experts, who are not from the nation being reviewed, 
and those experts are assigned by the OECD to the peer-review 
group for each phase of the OECD monitoring process.38 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention provides a clear structure 
for criminalizing and creating liability for bribes flowing to foreign 
public officials.39  Articles 1 and 2 clearly denote a criminal offense 
of bribery for payments to foreign public officials by legal persons.40  
Articles 3 and 4 create criminal and/or non-criminal sanctions for 
offenses and national jurisdiction over bribery of foreign officials.41 
Furthermore, Articles 5 and 6 of the Anti-Bribery Convention 
provide enforcement according to the applicable rules and 
principles, and an adequate period for the statutes of limitations to 
allow for proper investigation and prosecution.42  Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Anti-Bribery Convention denote that money laundering should 
be treated in the same way as bribery and the accounting or auditing 
standards for financial statements must be regulated in each nation 
to facilitate proper corporate recordkeeping.43  Articles 9 and 10 
create a basic structure among the OECD nations for mutual legal 
assistance and extradition for the offense of bribery.44  Articles 11 
                                                             
 37 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdanti-
briberyconventionentryintoforceoftheconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/WEW3-
NU9C] (giving the current status and a brief overview of the Convention); see also 
Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7 (laying out the 
four phases of the Convention’s monitoring process). 
 38 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7. 
 39 See generally OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 16 (establishing liability 
for bribes to foreign public officials). 
 40 Id. at arts. 1 & 2. 
 41 Id. at arts. 3 & 4. 
 42 Id. at arts. 5 & 6. 
 43 Id. at arts. 7 & 8. 
 44 Id. at arts. 9 & 10. 
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and 12 designate the Secretary-General of the OECD as the sole 
channel of communication for making and receiving requests and 
cooperation among parties for the bribery monitoring and follow-
up inquiries.45  Finally, Articles 13-17 provide treaty procedures for 
monitoring the country obligations under the Anti-Bribery 
Convention and outline procedures for regular reporting, treaty 
signature and accession, and entry into force.46 
The Anti-Bribery Convention has a monitoring process with four 
phases that has been touted as the “gold standard” of rigorous peer-
review monitoring by Transparency International.47  Phase 1 review, 
which began in 1999, evaluated the implementing legislation of each 
country and the adequacy of national legislation according to OECD 
norms.48  Phase 2 review and associated reports assessed the 
effectiveness of the application of the national legislation in each 
country.49  Currently, most OECD nations have concluded the most 
recent Phase 3 review.  Phase 3 review focuses on enforcement of the 
Anti-Bribery Convention, any outstanding concerns from Phase 2 
reports and review, and the 2009 Recommendation for Further 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.50  During the next 
year, the Phase 4 reviews of OECD countries will begin.  This final 
monitoring mechanism will focus on any outstanding issues from 
Phase 3 review, continued enforcement, and any cross-cutting issues 
that may be tailored to specific country needs.51 
 
  
                                                             
 45 Id. at arts. 11 & 12. 
 46 Id. at arts. 13–17. 
 47 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See, e.g., OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR FURTHER COMBATING 
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
(Nov. 26, 2009) (outlining further steps for countries to take to combat bribery in 
international business transactions). 
 51 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7. 
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4.  AN ANALYSIS OF OECD ENFORCEMENT AFTER PHASE 3 REVIEW52 
The following chart summarizes enforcement efforts by selected 
G20 countries that will be discussed in this Article:53 
 
 
This Section will review the most recent OECD Phase 3 reports 
and recommendations and any available follow-up reports 
regarding enforcement efforts in selected G20 countries.55 
These reports and the above chart reveal that some nations are 
complying with anti-bribery enforcement and meeting the 
standards of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  However, the 
reports also show that some nations are falling short of their 
obligations and have significant work to do to appropriately hinder 
                                                             
 52 These nations were selected G20 investment statistics from the World Bank 
and an equitable selection of countries from each region of the world.  See World 
Bank, Growth and Development in Emerging Markets and other Developing Countries, 
(Nov. 11, 2010) https://www.g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Session-
2_23.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P59-TP2U]; see also World Bank, G20 Financial 
Inclusion Indicators, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=g20-basic-set-of-
financial-inclusion-indicators [https://perma.cc/ZJ9R-5S6F]. 
 53 See 2015 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, supra 
note 27. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
supra note 7 (providing foreign bribery country reports). 
Selected G20 OECD Nations Enforcement (2015 Comparative Data)54 
Argentina No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Australia No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Brazil No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Canada Yes – 4 [Sanctions only] 
France Yes – 8/5 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Germany Yes – 68/3 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Italy Yes – 10/4 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Japan Yes – 10/2 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Mexico No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Russia No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
South Korea Yes – 16/4 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
Turkey No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
United Kingdom Yes – 10/2 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
United States Yes – 67/37 [=Sanctions/Acquittals] 
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bribery in the context of international business transactions.  The 
G20 countries’ enforcement analysis in this Article will fall into three 
categories: high enforcement, moderate enforcement, and limited 
enforcement.  Then, this Section will review possible reasons for lack 
of uniformity among OECD nations after review of the Phase 3 
reports including: i) effectiveness of the nation’s statute of 
limitations; ii) existence of whistleblower protection; iii) analysis of 
the domestic implementing legislation and national legal system; iv) 
enforcement mechanism(s) or procedure(s) available in the OECD 
nation; and v) severity of penalties under the national enforcement 
mechanism.  Additional OECD analyses and charts 
comprehensively show where bribes have been recently paid during 
international business transactions and where bribers are being 
punished.56  Some of the nations with the intake of bribes by public 
officials, including the United States, Germany, and Korea, are also 
the countries with the greatest punishment.57  Conversely, though, 
some of the other nations with bribery intake statistics, such as 
Russia and selected Asian countries, are not countries with high 
enforcement rates.58  A chart from the OECD highlights these 
disparities and notes those countries and regions, including Russia, 
China, most of Asia, the United States, and portions of South 
America, where bribes were most often received by public officials 
and paid between 1999-2014.59  This Section will analyze the legal 
structures of the enforcement mechanisms in countries with high 
enforcement, moderate enforcement, and low enforcement to glean 
any obstacles to further international conformity in aligning with the 
goals of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
                                                             
 56 See Ferdman, supra note 33 (describing how multinational corporations 
bribe foreign governments).  See also OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 26. 
 57 See OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 26 (“The United States has sanctioned individuals 
and entities for the foreign bribery offence in connection with 128 separate foreign 
bribery schemes; Germany has sanctioned individuals and entities for the foreign 
bribery offence in connection with 26 separate schemes; Korea in connection with 
11 . . . .”). 
 58 See id. at fig. 19. 
 59 See id. at fig. 18, 30.  See also, Ferdman, supra note 33. 
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4.1.  Examples of High Enforcement: Germany, Italy, South Korea, and 
United States 
4.1.1.  Germany 
Germany’s most recent report is a Phase 3 follow-up report in 
April 2013.60  Since the Phase 3 Report, Germany has continued its 
sanctioning of large numbers of individuals.61  From March 2011 to 
March 2013, thirty-three cases were ended for lack of grounds, 
twenty-one resulted in sanctions (after settlement or conviction).62  
As of March 2011, out of the sixty-nine persons who have been 
sanctioned for foreign bribery, thirty-five were sentenced following 
some type of agreement.63  Twenty-one German cases resulted in the 
sanctioning of 141 individuals (one case consisted of sixty-one 
individuals).64  Out of those, forty-three were for bribery of a foreign 
public official, eighty for making commercial bribes, and eighteen 
were for “breach of trust and tax evasion.”65  A bill is being discussed 
in Germany that could make the sanctions and penalties for foreign 
bribery even more serious.66  Germany has held conferences and has 
proposed initiatives that have increased awareness of the offense.67  
The OECD Working Group stated that more public awareness needs 
to be raised in Germany concerning the fact that the criteria or 
elements of the offense are to be interpreted broadly, not narrowly.68  
The way that facilitation payments should be treated according to 
German law is also vague and public education should be 
augmented.69  Germany has not introduced any bills with respect to 
                                                             
 60 See generally OECD, GERMANY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 15, 2013) (reporting on the state of foreign bribery in 
Germany). 
 61 See id at 3–4 (summarizing findings). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. at 3, 20. 
 68 See id. at 6–11 (describing recommendations and actions taken to respond to 
recommendations). 
 69 Id. 
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whistleblower protection.70  A further report has been requested 
from the Working Group. 
During Phase 3 and the most recent Phase 4 Report review in 
Germany, the OECD Working Group reported that enforcement had 
increased since Phase 2 and Germany is the leader of enforcement 
in Europe.71  It stated that previous penalties and fines had been 
“generally low,” in Germany and that a majority of prison sentences 
had been suspended”72  Furthermore, the Working Group found it 
to be highly effective that Germany had required its tax auditors to 
report suspected instances of bribery.73  In summary, the Working 
Group noted that provisions adopting Article 1 of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention had not yet been fully integrated by the German 
legislature.74  Since Phase 3 review, though, Germany had 
investigated a total of 121 cases and forty-seven cases resulted in 
sanctions.75 
4.1.2.  Italy 
Italy’s most recent report is a Phase 3 follow-up report in 2014.76  
Italy has prosecuted 133 persons, 104 natural persons, and twenty-
nine legal persons since the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered 
                                                             
 70 See id. at 22. 
 71 See generally  OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY CONVENTION IN GERMANY (Mar. 17, 2011) (reporting on Germany’s progress 
in implementing recommendations to improve its foreign bribery enforcement); see 
also OECD, PHASE 4 REPORT: GERMANY (June 14,  2018) (evaluating and making 
further recommendations regarding Germany’s implementation of foreign bribery 
enforcement initiatives); John Bray, Compliance Alert: OECD confirms Germany as 
leading enforcer, FCPA Blog, (July 17, 2018), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/7/17/compliance-alert-oecd-confirms-
germany-as-leading-enforcer.html [https://perma.cc/B6JE-EKC7] (summarizing 
Germany’s progress in foreign bribery enforcement and providing 
recommendations for future improvement). 
 72 See PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
IN GERMANY, supra note 71, at  10. 
 73 Id. at 22–23. 
 74 Id. at 30. 
 75 See PHASE 4 REPORT: GERMANY, supra note 71, at 12. 
 76 See generally OECD, ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 20, 2014). 
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into force.77  Of those prosecutions, twelve have been sanctioned 
through patteggiamento (“plea bargain”), and seventy-two had their 
cases dismissed as time barred.78  The other Italian prosecutions 
were acquitted or had their case dismissed for lack of grounds.  Since 
the Phase 3 report, no new foreign bribery case has been finalized.79  
There was a legal person convicted in 2013, but an appeal is pending 
on that case.80  Italy implemented, at least partially, a number of 
Phase 3 recommendations.81  These include lengthening limitation 
periods (“SOLs”) for offenses and protection for whistleblowers.82  
The Working Group stated, however, that “the vast majority of the 
recommendations remain partially or not implemented.”83  Of the 
Phase 3 recommendations, five have been fully implemented, ten 
have been partially implemented, and six have not been 
implemented at all (twenty-one total).84  There have not been any 
steps taken toward making both imprisonment and fines available 
to Italian judges.85  There have also been no attempts to increase fines 
for violations by legal persons.86  Italy has introduced, though, a new 
registry system that was to become operational as of 2014.87  Italy 
has undertaken more training for law enforcement personnel and 
has taken steps to increase public awareness.88  While public sector 
employees have increased whistleblower protection, Italy is only in 
the beginning stages of providing such protection to the private 
sector to support anti-bribery efforts.89  For export credit and public 
                                                             
 77 Id. at 4–6 (summarizing findings). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 4. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 5.  See also, Bribery & Corruption: Italy,  GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS (2018), 
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-
laws-and-regulations/Italy [https://perma.cc/FSG7-AF86] (reporting that Italy’s 
new compliance procedures within the public administration aim to improve 
transparency). 
 89 ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
76, at 5. 
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advantages, some steps have been taken by Italy; however, the 
OECD Working Group feels that more can and should be done.90  A 
further follow up was requested after this most recent report to 
address the deficiencies in anti-bribery efforts in Italy. 
During Phase 3, the OECD Working Group found that although 
sixty defendants had been prosecuted and nine were under 
investigation, actual sanctions were only imposed on three 
persons.91  Enforcement of foreign bribery laws were found to have 
caused internal compliance programs to be formed in Italy.92  
Finally, agencies that administer public benefits were also putting 
policies in place in order to prevent or detect foreign bribery.93 
4.1.3.  South Korea 
The most recent report on Korea was the Phase 3 follow up in 
2014.94  Korea has fully implemented ten recommendations, 
partially implemented four, and two recommendations have not 
been implemented at all.95  Korea has created a new consultative 
body in an attempt to strengthen the country’s information and 
                                                             
 90 Id. 
 91 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN ITALY 5 (Dec. 16, 2011).  See also Steven R. Salbu, Transnational 
Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 435, 445–447 (2001) (noting the 
likely chilling effect of sanctions on borderline corrupt behaviors). 
 92 ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
76, at 5. 
 93 PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN 
ITALY, supra note 91, at. 5. 
 94 See generally OECD, KOREA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 8, 2014).  See generally, South Korea Corruption Report, BUS. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL (May 2017), https://www.business-anti-
corruption.com/country-profiles/south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/A99Y-HX7S] 
(listing South Korea’s main legislative frameworks that address corruption); see also 
South Korea Fines Prominent Pharmaceutical Manufacturer in Latest Anti-Corruption 
Enforcement Efforts, ROPES & GRAY (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2017/05/South-Korea-Fines-
Prominent-Pharmaceutical-Manufacturer-in-Latest-Anti-Corruption 
[https://perma.cc/FD78-93WH] (reporting that South Korea is increasing its anti-
corruption enforcement efforts). 
 95 KOREA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
94, at 4–5 (listing findings). 
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intelligence capability.96  Korea has also ceased destroying records 
of foreign bribery every three years, and will now keep them up to 
seventy years (and possibly longer).97  The OECD Working Group 
suggests that Korea make sure that foreign bribery offenses reach 
those from the North Korean regime, or the Kaesong Industrial 
Zone.98  Small facilitation payments have been outlawed in South 
Korea.99  Penalties that are applied in practice continue to be 
“insufficiently effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”100  There 
have been five convictions since the Phase 3 report, and those have 
resulted in no jail time and small fines.101  Korea has made attempts 
to raise awareness of foreign bribery offenses, but law enforcement 
officials need more awareness that legal persons are also subject to 
punishment, not solely natural persons.102  The Working Group 
states that money laundering recommendations have been partially 
implemented, but they worry that large conglomerates will prevent 
detection by laundering money.103  Korea has made it mandatory for 
auditors to report suspicions of foreign bribery and has afforded 
those auditors “due protection” in doing so.104  There have been 
around twenty cases of foreign bribery in Korea.105  Upon receiving 
referral from foreign authorities, Korean Maritime Police detected 
sixteen other cases of foreign bribery.  Eleven of those sixteen cases 
were dismissed because the payments were classified as small 
facilitation payments.106  Overall, since the Phase 3 review, most of 
those cases involved the bribery of foreign military staff on Korean 
soil. 
                                                             
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 4. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 5. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 5. 
 106 Id. (“In 11 of the 16 cases, the prosecution was suspended because they 
concerned small facilitation payments.”).  Four natural persons and one legal 
person were convicted. 
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4.1.4.  United States 
The United States has had vigorous prosecutions since the 
United States passed implementing legislation to the OECD 
Convention in the form of the FCPA.107  The Phase 3 OECD 
evaluation report in October 2010 also reveals that the United States 
has continued to strongly enforce the FCPA.108  The prosecution of 
cases in the United States has steadily increased since the inception 
of the FCPA as implementing legislation for the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.109  Since the Phase 3 report, more than fifteen 
individuals were charged and sentenced to imprisonment ranging 
from three to fifteen years.110  Criminal fines against corporations 
were also imposed in thirty-eight  cases, ranging from USD 32,000 
to USD 218.8 million.111  The United States has implemented all but 
one of the Working Group’s recommendations since the Phase 3 
review, which is increasing in the length of the statute of 
limitations.112 
During the last two years, the SEC recovered almost USD 340 
million in thirty-three actions, and the DOJ actions resulted in nearly 
USD 750 million in penalties in thirty-one cases.113  Under the 
current structure of the statute, the FCPA’s criminal provision and 
its statute of limitations is five years.114  This may be extended up to 
                                                             
 107 See generally Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance 
and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1161 (Dec. 2017). 
 108 See generally OECD, UNITED STATES: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 109 See, e.g., Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions 
[https://perma.cc/3MF9-KQQS].  From 1977 to early 1990s, there were fewer than 
twenty enforcement actions.  After the 1990s, though, there was a great expansion 
in enforcement with some years (e.g., 1999), yielding at least twenty actions per 
year.  This appears to be slowing down, though, under the Trump administration 
with only two enforcement actions pending this year.  See Related Enforcement 
Actions: 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2018 [https://perma.cc/7VTW-X9PQ]. 
 110 UNITED STATES: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 108, at 3. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 5. 
 114 Id. at 5–6. 
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three years in cases where information is formally sought in a 
foreign country.115  Therefore, because most FCPA cases will involve 
some foreign evidence, the effective statute of limitations is more 
than five years.  The DOJ is currently considering further measures 
to extend the statute of limitations through legislative action.116  
Since the Phase 3 review, the United States has vigorously pursued 
violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions and IRS criminal 
investigation special agents have assisted in several criminal 
investigations involving violations of the FCPA.117  Overall, the 
United States still remains a beacon in anti-bribery prosecution 
efforts through its federal statutory structure for criminalizing and 
punishing bribery acts and recovering bribes paid under the FCPA.  
However, the future of FCPA prosecution and vigilance of anti-
bribery efforts is uncertain under the current Trump 
administration.118 
4.2.  Examples of Moderate Enforcement: Australia, Canada, France, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom 
4.2.1.  Australia 
The most recent report filed by Australia is a Phase 3 follow-up 
report in 2015.119  In that report, the Working Group found that 
Australia had taken many steps to implement the Phase 3 
recommendations.120  Of the Phase 3 recommendations, sixteen of 
thirty-three have been fully implemented, nine have been partially 
                                                             
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 6. 
 117 Id. at 15–18. 
 118 See, e.g., Jim Zarroli, Trump Used To Disparage An Anti-Bribery Law: Will He 
Enforce It Now?, NPR (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/08/561059555/trump-used-to-disparage-an-anti-
bribery-law-will-he-enforce-it-now [https://perma.cc/NKK8-CA2P] (describing 
President Trump’s reactions to the law). 
 119 See generally OECD, AUSTRALIA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 3, 2015). 
 120 Id. at 4–5 (summarizing findings). 
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implemented, and eight have not been implemented at all.121  Since 
the Phase 3 report, there have been fifteen bribery allegations in 
Australia.122  The number of investigations has gone up from seven 
in October 2012 to seventeen at the time of the follow up to Phase 
3.123  Australia has taken steps to make the public aware of the 
distinction between “facilitation payments” and bribes.124  The 
Australian coalition government has established a Fraud and Anti-
Corruption Centre, located in the Australian Federal Police 
Headquarters.125  They have also given presentations to regional 
Australian and foreign business communities on the particulars of 
the foreign bribery offense in order to increase compliance.126 
In Phase 3 review, the Working Group said that Australia’s first 
group of bribery prosecutions began in 2011 with charges in the 
Securency/NPA case.127  Other than this leading Australian anti-
bribery case, though, they have enforced the foreign bribery laws in 
a very limited way.128  Although, the Working Group found that the 
lack of enforcement was not due to a lack of allegations.  Between 
Phases 2 and 3, there were twenty-eight allegations of foreign 
bribery; twelve were evaluated, rejected for investigation, and 
terminated, and nine were investigated but were closed due to 
insufficient evidence.129  As of the Phase 3 report, seven 
investigations for bribery were ongoing.130  Two more cases were 
closed between Phases 2 and 3.131  Even the major Australian case, 
the Securency/NPA case, was “initially rejected after a whistleblower 
came forth” and investigation of the case did not occur until after 
                                                             
 121 Id. at 4. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 5. 
 125 Id. at 42–43. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 4. 
 128 Id. (“Australia still has only 1 prosecution in the Securency/NPA case; this 
has been before the courts since prior to Phase 3.”). 
 129 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN AUSTRALIA 9 (OCT. 12, 2012). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. 
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that company self-reported in the following year.132  In summary, 
Australia is diligently meeting its international obligations to 
prevent bribery in international business under the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention and has been responsive to recommendations 
from OECD representatives during the routine site visits. 
4.2.2.  Canada 
The most recent report on Canada has been a Phase 3 follow 
up.133  Canada has continued to enforce the anti-bribery laws since 
the Phase 3 report was adopted.  In that time, two new convictions 
have been obtained against oil and gas companies.134  One company 
pleaded guilty, was fined CDN 9.5 million, and received three years 
of probation.135  The other company self-disclosed and was fined 
CDN 10.35 million.136  Two further companies have been indicted in 
the technology and construction sectors.  Canada has also reported 
that there are thirty-five investigations that are ongoing.137  Canada 
has amended its laws to clarify ambiguities, as well as to allow for 
prosecution of Canadian individuals or companies, wherever the 
actual bribery occurs.138  The Working Group added that there are 
several areas where “recommendations have not been fully met.”139  
                                                             
 132 Id. at 9.  See also, Nick McKenzie & Richard Baker, Guilty Plea, Finally, in 
Reserve Bank Bribery Case, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/guilty-plea-finally-in-reserve-
bank-bribery-case-20180521-p4zgl1.html [https://perma.cc/95UV-Y9ZZ] (“A 
former Reserve Bank company executive has pleaded guilty to criminal charges in 
one of Australia’s most protracted corruption prosecutions over a payment to a 
Malaysian arms dealer to grease the wheels of a business deal.”). 
 133 See generally OECD, CANADA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 14, 2013).  See also, Alan Katz, Foreign Bribery Crackdowns 
Haven’t Dented Practice, Report Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-11/foreign-bribery-
enforcement-hasn-t-dented-practice-report-says [https://perma.cc/5FDW-KGZG] 
(describing Canada’s enforcement activities). 
 134 CANADA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 133 at 3. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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Examples include, “recommendations to enhance audit 
requirements” and to develop a desk book to help Canadians 
understand the offense.140  Some other recommendations have been 
fully implemented, such as making a conviction result in automatic 
disbarment from contracting with Canada Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, and maintaining resources that are 
allocated to investigating claims.141  There are currently charges 
pending against three natural persons under the Corruption of 
Public Officials Act (CFPOA).142  Penalties can include up to fourteen 
years of imprisonment, and there has been “a new books and 
records offense” added to the laws that is linked specifically to 
foreign bribery.143 
During the Phase 3 review in 2011, Canada had one recent 
conviction, one ongoing conviction, and over twenty investigations 
underway.144  Overall, Canada is being responsive to its 
international obligations to combat bribery in international business 
during the Phase 3 and Phase 3 follow up review process.  However, 
the Working Group found that the framework of Canada’s foreign 
bribery laws was lacking in four ways: (1) it only applied to bribes 
“for profit,” (2) sanctions were often too lenient in practice, (3) 
offenses required a real and substantial link to Canada, and (4) the 
definitions of the proper factors to consider were vague.145 
4.2.3.  France 
The most recent report on France is the Phase 3 follow-up report 
in December 2014.146  Since Phase 3, “France has opened twenty-four 
new procedures,” but no legal person has been convicted yet.147  
                                                             
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 5. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN CANADA 5 (Mar. 18, 2011). 
 145 Id. at 5–6. 
 146 See generally OECD, FRANCE: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 19, 2014). 
 147 Id. at 4. 
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Only three individuals have been convicted in two cases, resulting 
in fines ranging from EUR 5,000 to EUR 20,000.148  According to the 
follow-up report, acquittals, case closures, and dismissals have risen 
from twelve to thirty-one since Phase 3 began.149 
Despite the changes in Phase 3, France still needs to implement 
more changes to improve its foreign bribery laws.  The definition of 
“foreign public official” needs clarification in France.150  There has 
been no legislative action to repeal the “dual criminality 
requirement” for the offense of foreign bribery.151  There are various 
case law principles in French law, such as “corruption pact,” that 
interfere with enforcement.152  Efforts to train the judiciary on the 
enforcement of criminal liability for violations need to be 
strengthened.153  The fine for natural persons has been increased to 
EUR 1 million, which can be increased to double the proceeds of the 
offense, and for legal persons (EUR 5 million) can be increased to ten 
times the proceeds.154  Until very recently, there was no proof that 
these penalties were being implemented in France.155  Other than 
releasing a guide for judges on confiscation, no steps have been 
taken to encourage confiscation.156  Prosecution in the wake of victim 
complaints is now possible for acts committed entirely or partially 
                                                             
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 9.  
 152 Id. at 10–12. 
 153 Id. at 4. 
 154 Id. at 4–5. 
 155 Id. at 5 (“Notwithstanding, there  exists  no  sufficiently  convincing  
practice  that would demonstrate that these recommendations are being fully 
implemented.”).  See Olga Greenberg et al., In a First Coordinated Resolution, US and 
French Authorities Announce Agreement to Settle Criminal Charges with Paris-Based 
Societe Generale S.A., Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=76a4d3f1-98c4-45b2-ab96-
4dd7c64e153e [https://perma.cc/RS6Y-4DQH] (discussing the first coordinated 
resolution with international authorities in a bribery case); see also France Suspects 
Bribery in Multibillion Dollar Submarine Sale to Brazil, OCCRP (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/6491-france-suspects-bribery-in-multibillion-
dollar-submarine-sale-to-brazil-4 [https://perma.cc/RS6Y-4DQH] (discussing the 
French investigation of a French industrial company and its payments to Brazilian 
authorities). 
 156 FRANCE: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 146, at 5. 
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in France.157  Also, anti-corruption organizations can file civil party 
claims against those who violate foreign bribery laws.158  
Interestingly, the public prosecutor’s office can only bring 
proceedings for an offense committed abroad if a victim has filed a 
prior complaint or there has been an official accusation made by the 
country where the offense happened.159  A national prosecutor has 
been established to pursue foreign bribery cases.  France has refused 
to extend its three-year statute of limitations on foreign bribery.160 
In the Phase 3 report, it was reported that only thirty-three 
proceedings had been initiated in the country, and five convictions 
were obtained since France became a party to the OECD Convention 
in 2000.161  The Working Group was “particularly concerned by 
France’s lackluster response to companies that have been sanctioned 
by other parties to the Convention.”162  They commended France for 
guaranteeing greater independence for prosecutors, but there were 
limited resources that have been made available for 
investigations.163  Overall, there were no convictions in France for 
bribery of public officials before 2008.164  A month and a half before 
the Phase 3 report was adopted, France convicted its first legal 
person for bribery.165 
4.2.4.  Japan 
Japan’s most recent report was a Phase 3 follow-up report in 
February 2014.166  After Phase 3 was adopted, Japan convicted a 
former senior executive of a Japanese company for foreign 
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bribery.167  The individual was fined the equivalent of 
approximately USD 5,003.168  The Working Group stated that it 
“believe[d] the implementation of the [treaty] is not given adequate 
priority by the Japanese, including a lack of resources for detecting, 
investigating, and prosecuting foreign bribery cases.”169 
As of the Phase 3 follow up, Japan still had not established any 
authority for confiscating proceeds of foreign bribery; the country 
also had not made bribery a predicate offense for money 
laundering.170  The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry plays 
a pivotal role in the enforcement of the foreign bribery laws, and the 
Working Group is concerned about the suitability of the group for 
the job because the information they release is vague or unclear.171  
Japan has also not taken steps to ensure that tax inspectors identify 
and report potential foreign bribery.172  Japan increased the statute 
of limitations for crimes from three to five years, but this limitation 
still causes problems with enforcement.173  Japan has taken steps to 
allow tax authorities to share tax information with law enforcement 
and the judiciary.174 
Overall, the recommendations for improving Japan’s auditing 
and accounting framework have been fully implemented, and Japan 
has been increasing public awareness of the illegality of foreign 
bribery.175  Japan has been coordinating efforts to detect, as well as 
to prevent, foreign bribery in international business transactions 
benefiting from official credit support.176  It has been asked to report 
again to the OECD on any improvements next year. 
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During the Phase 3 report in 2011, Japan was said to have 
convicted only two cases since 1999.177  One of those caused four 
convictions for natural persons.178  The Working Group urged Japan 
to take more steps because two cases in over twelve years is very 
low for a major world economy like Japan’s.179 
4.2.5.  United Kingdom 
The most recent report from the United Kingdom was the Phase 
3 follow-up report in 2014.180  During the OECD Phase 3 review, 
there had been a significant increase in enforcement actions since 
Phase 2.181  The working group is concerned that the United 
Kingdom is relying more on civil recovery orders, which have less 
judicial oversight and are less transparent than criminal plea 
agreements.182  This low level of transparency hinders analysis of the 
foreign bribery situation in the United Kingdom, and it also does not 
increase public awareness of the crime.183  There have also been 
confidentiality agreements in some settlements that presented the 
same problems.184  In addition, the progress of implementing the 
Anti-Bribery Convention in the territories is slow.  The United 
Kingdom has, however, made attempts to raise awareness of the 
offense.185  The United Kingdom maintained eleven active cases and 
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had eighteen cases under consideration as of January 2012.186  Since 
2008, three individuals and two companies have been convicted; in 
addition, two financial institutions have been fined for failing to 
adopt corporate compliance measures to prevent bribery.187  Finally, 
another company has been sanctioned for accounting related 
misconduct, and four more businesses have received civil recovery 
orders.188 
After the Phase 3 follow up, the level of enforcement of serious 
offenses has declined.189  In the thirty months before Phase 3, nine 
actions relating to foreign bribery were concluded.190  In the twenty-
seven months after, only two have occurred, one of which resulted 
in acquittal.191  The UK Bribery Act, instituted in 2011, has seen no 
actions enforced under it, although it provides minimal progress on 
its own.192  The enforcement budget has stayed the same, but 
“blockbuster funding” is available in special or serious bribery 
cases.193  A self-report now deflects prosecution if it “is part of a 
genuinely proactive approach” by the offender.194  The timing of the 
self-report is a key consideration.  During a settlement, if the settling 
party is found not to have disclosed further offenses, they may still 
be prosecuted for those offenses; such agreements do not give 
blanket immunity to further prosecution.195  Deferred prosecution 
agreements have come into use in the United Kingdom.196  The 
United Kingdom has taken no steps since Phase 3 review to make 
Article 5 of the Anti-Bribery Convention clearly binding.197  A new 
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database is being developed for MLA (“Mutual Legal Assistance”) 
statistics.198  Interestingly, the concept of “facilitation payments” is 
not recognized under UK law.199  There has been no change in export 
credit practice, and the United Kingdom states that it reviews tax 
records of defendants in foreign bribery cases, but there is no 
evidence of this being done in practice.200 
During its recent Phase 4 report, the peer reviewers noted that 
the United Kingdom has concluded nine cases involving criminal 
liability and has increased enforcement.201  Since the OECD 
convention entered into force in 1999 until 2016, there have been 
over 100 allegations of foreign bribery and fifty case investigations 
with thirteen cases of criminal liability.202  In the United Kingdom, 
whistleblower protection is ensured under the UK’s Public Interest 
Disclosure Act of 1998 (PIDA), which protects employees after 
disclosing misconduct, including foreign bribery.203  The penalties 
for concluded cases in the United Kingdom include sentences 
ranging from suspended terms of imprisonment to three years of 
imprisonment.204  In all five criminal cases against legal persons after 
Phase 3, the gross profit from the misconduct has been assessed and 
confiscated in addition to punitive or remedial sanctions.205  Overall, 
the United Kingdom has demonstrated good practices with 
confiscation in foreign bribery cases since Phase 3.206 
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4.3.  Countries with Limited Enforcement: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey 
4.3.1.  Argentina 
The Working Group said in their Phase 3 report that Argentina 
is “seriously non-compliant” with the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention obligations after reviewing information from the June 
2014 on-site visit.207  Argentina has not implemented prior 
recommendations calling for the introduction of corporate liability 
for foreign bribery, has not passed laws that give national 
jurisdiction to prosecute violations, and has also failed to rectify 
several shortcomings with respect to its foreign bribery offense 
scheme.208  However, there have been some efforts by Argentina to 
improve the situation and to create structures to prevent bribery in 
the context of business and procurement of contracts.209  Argentina 
must next make a 3bis report to the Working Group due to 
substantial non-compliance.210  Argentina became a party to the 
Anti-Bribery Convention in 2001, and there have been ten 
allegations of foreign bribery since then.211  Three of those are 
currently under investigation as of the Phase 3 report.212  Two of 
them closed without any charges.  One case did not have an 
investigation due to a lack of information.  Another turned out to 
involve other offenses, not foreign bribery.  There have been two 
allegations of potential foreign bribery after the on-site visit of the 
Working Group, but they are so far unofficial and unconfirmed.213  
Finally, the tenth allegation surfaced ten days before the Phase 3 
report was published.  Argentina has not passed laws giving it the 
ability to impose sanctions against “legal person” for foreign bribery 
as of the Phase 3 report, so the Committee required follow-up 
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reports by the end of 2016.214  Argentina has extradition treaties with 
fourteen countries, including eleven members of the Working 
Group.215  For progress towards raising awareness of the crime and 
anti-bribery efforts, the Working Group in Phase 3 said that 
Argentina has taken only “limited steps.”216  In summary, according 
to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and based on the recent 
comprehensive Phase 3 report and findings, Argentina is falling 
behind on its international obligations to combat bribery. 
During the on-site visit in 2014, the Working Group found that 
prosecutors and investigative judges in charge of the foreign bribery 
cases did not attend the on-site visits.217  Their absence seriously 
undermined the effectiveness of the visit and precluded a full 
assessment of Argentina’s enforcements efforts in practice.218  The 
peer-review Working Group concluded that Argentina remains in 
serious non-compliance with key articles of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention.219  The corporate liability bill did not enter into force in 
Argentina and efforts to draft a revision to the Argentinian penal 
code were also abandoned since the Phase 3 review.220  There have 
only been thirteen known foreign bribery allegations involving 
Argentine companies and individuals, and eight allegations are still 
under investigation.221  Argentina has not enacted a specific law on 
whistleblowing, and the report expressed serious concerns about the 
lack of proactive investigations for foreign bribery allegations or 
seeking the cooperation of foreign authorities.222  Under current 
Argentinian law, money laundering offenses are punishable by 
imprisonment of six months to three years, bribery and improper 
lobbying are punished with imprisonment of one to six years and 
perpetual disqualification, and foreign bribery is punished with 
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reclusion (imprisonment) from one to six years and special 
disqualification for life for any public office.223 
4.3.2.  Brazil 
Brazil’s most recent report has been its Phase 3 follow-up report 
in February 2017.224  This report reveals substantial progress in 
Brazil although they are still substantially behind countries with 
high or moderate enforcement.  Based on the thirty-nine Phase 3 
recommendations from 2014, eighteen recommendations have been 
fully implemented, thirteen partially implemented, and eight are 
not yet implemented.225  Overall, this shows positive progress to 
combat bribery from Brazil in international business dealings. 
The Phase 3 Working Group congratulated Brazil for 
implementing a new corporate liability law.226  The country also 
indicted nine individuals as a result of a single case of foreign 
bribery.227  Despite this progress, though, the OECD Working Group 
remains concerned about enforcement on anti-bribery norms in 
Brazil.228  In the fourteen years since Brazil became a party to the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, only five cases have been 
brought.229  Of those five cases, only three are ongoing (and two are 
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“far from reaching the prosecutorial stage”).230  A possible obstacle 
for enforcement in Brazil may be a statute of limitations which can 
result in lightly sentenced cases being dismissed, as well as a lack of 
protection for whistleblowers.231  The group suggests that Brazil 
needs to train law enforcement on how to investigate foreign bribery 
properly, as well as how to freeze and/or confiscate assets.232  They 
could also implement leniency or cooperation agreements to entice 
offenders to self-report.233  The enforcement against false accounting 
practices meant to hide foreign bribery also needs to be 
strengthened.234  Brazil has made some efforts to increase awareness 
about corporate fraud.235  For the foreign bribery offense, 
individuals can receive one to eight years of imprisonment.236  Also, 
fines between the equivalent of EUR eighty and EUR 428,000 can be 
added alongside, but not instead of, jail time.237  Fines can also be 
increased up to threefold if Brazilian authorities find that the 
maximum fine is inadequate.  Brazilian law currently provides a fine 
reduction for cooperating with authorities.238  
4.3.3.  Mexico 
Mexico’s most recent report is the Phase 3 follow-up report in 
2014.239  Mexico has implemented four recommendations fully, ten 
partially, and eight recommendations were not implemented at all 
from the Phase 3 review.240  Mexico still has zero prosecutions or 
                                                             
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 45–63. 
 232 Id. at 5. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 18–20. 
 236 Id. at 23. 
 237 Id at 23. 
 238 See generally Joan Meyer & Fernando Correa da Costa, U.S.-Brazil Alignment 
Is Incentivizing Companies to Settle Corruption Cases, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Aug. 
30, 2017, https://globalcompliancenews.com/us-brazil-alignment-corruption-
cases-20170830/ [https://perma.cc/D92K-5R3J]. 
 239 See generally OECD, MEXICO: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (June 16, 2014). 
 240 Id. at 3. 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/4
2019] International Anti-Bribery Norms and Enforcement 499 
convictions for foreign bribery.241  A single investigation began in 
2014 and is still ongoing.242  There have been no laws adopted with 
respect to confiscation of the proceeds from foreign bribery, but 
Mexico claims that it can enforce it nonetheless.243  A “Special 
Prosecutor’s Office for the Combat against Corruption” has been 
established, but Mexico will not supply any information as to its 
financial or human resources.244  Mexican authorities have used 
“special investigative techniques,” such as wiretapping and 
undercover operations, when investigating foreign bribes.245  
Mexico also has supplied insufficient statistics on domestic 
bribery.246  No additions to auditing or corporate compliance have 
been made since the Phase 3 OECD Report.247  The Mexican Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and ProMéxico have engaged in awareness-
raising in Mexico.248  However, no information has been supplied by 
Mexico with regard to disbarment from public procurement as a 
potential punishment for violators of the country’s labor laws.249 
4.3.4.  Russia 
Russia’s most recent report is a Phase 2 follow-up report in 
2016.250  In the report, Russia did not provide a complete report of 
activities, only fifteen of the Working Group’s Phase 1 
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recommendations were addressed.251  Russia has implemented ten 
recommendations, twenty-one have been partially implemented, 
and nineteen have not been implemented at all.252  Four 
recommendations by the OECD were considered implemented, but 
later had follow up issues.253  Russia has not detected, prosecuted, 
or adjudicated any cases of foreign bribery.254  However, there are 
some efforts to raise awareness of the offense in Russia.255  The 
systems in place to detect bribery and similar offenses focus on 
domestic offenses, not foreign or international ones.256  Russia has 
indicated that it is in the process of drafting whistleblower laws.257  
Russia has taken steps to ensure that those who request export credit 
assistance are aware of the offense of foreign bribery.258  The 
Working Group says that Russia should focus its efforts around the 
arms and military because these areas are particularly sensitive to 
bribery.259  Furthermore, Russia has “promoted its anti-corruption 
charter,” but there is only a single sentence that addresses internal 
controls and it gives no guidance.260  Russia has monitored the 
actions of law enforcement through the opening and closing of 
investigations, including foreign bribery.261  The country has an 
affirmative defense of “effective regret,” as well as one of “economic 
extortion” that can hinder prosecution of bribery.262  The Working 
Group suggests that Russia should take measures to punish those 
who do not complete a bribe, but have offered, or promised, to do 
so in order to better align with international standards under the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.263  In addition, Russia has not taken 
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any actions to allow confiscation of bribery proceeds.264  Overall, the 
OECD Working Group requires that Russia continues follow-up 
reports every six months, detailing the steps they are taking to 
further compliance of national implementation procedures to 
prevent bribery.265 
4.3.5.  Turkey 
The most recent Turkish report was the Phase 3 Report in 2014.266  
There has not been a single foreign bribery conviction during the 
eleven years since Turkey joined the Convention.267  Ten allegations 
have come to light since 2003.268  Turkish authorities have taken 
limited steps in six of those allegations, there has been one acquittal, 
and two are ongoing due to mutual legal assistance requests.269  
Three allegations were terminated for insufficient evidence.270  There 
have been no steps taken in two of the cases, and Turkey was 
unaware of two instances, despite them being in the international 
press.271  Turkey has also had no enforcement against legal persons 
for bribery.272  Turkey’s corporate liability laws may further not 
cover state-owned enterprises.273  The Working Group is concerned 
that investigations and prosecutions may be subject to undue 
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political influence.274  There is insufficient whistleblower protection 
in both the public and private sectors in Turkey.275  More specific 
awareness for bribery and anti-bribery efforts is needed in Turkey 
to inform businesses about the offense.276  Overall, there have been 
minimal legislative efforts to strengthen the punishments for the 
offense of foreign bribery, and certain steps have been taken to bar 
those convicted from public tender participation in Turkey.277 
Turkey’s follow-up to the Phase 3 report demonstrates limited 
progress.278  Of the two investigations that had been underway at 
the time of Phase 3, one had not progressed and the other appeared 
to have been closed.279  The Working Group had continued concerns 
about lack of enforcement and lack of proactive steps by Turkey’s 
law enforcement authorities or international cooperation through 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.280  Further, Turkey has not amended 
its laws or taken any other measures to clarify that all Turkish legal 
persons can be held liable for foreign bribery or that legal persons 
can be held liable without prosecution of a natural person.281  
Additionally, Turkey has not increased sanctions applicable to legal 
persons or ensured confiscation of bribe proceeds in accordance 
with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s standards.282  Turkish 
legislation has not been amended to include the protection of 
whistleblowers, but Turkey has raised some awareness of the need 
to detect and report allegations of foreign bribery.283  Turkey has 
taken some steps to improve detection of foreign bribery in money 
laundering cases; however, Turkey has not addressed the issue of 
politically exposed persons in its anti-money-laundering 
                                                             
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN 
TURKEY, supra note 272, at 6. 
 278 See generally OECD, TURKEY: FOLLOW-UP TO PHASE 3 REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 31, 2017) (reporting on Turkey’s progress in 
implementing anti-bribery mechanisms). 
 279 Id. at 4. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 5. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/4
2019] International Anti-Bribery Norms and Enforcement 503 
legislation.284  As a result, the follow-up report still had serious 
concerns about the lack of enforcement activity and slow progress 
in Turkey with regard to many of the Working Group’s Phase 3 
recommendations.285 
5.  OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE LACK OF ADEQUATE ANTI-
BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATED IN THE RECENT OECD 
PHASE 3 AND FOLLOW UP REPORTS 
The persistent lack of adequate anti-bribery enforcement, which 
still persists in G20 nations after the formal adoption of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention by the international community over 
twenty years ago, is disturbing.286  The United States continues to be 
a beacon in anti-bribery enforcement measures and has the most 
sophisticated implementing legislation through the passage of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and later amendments to the Act that 
implemented the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.287  After 
reviewing the most recent peer-review Working Group reports and 
recommendations for the selected G20 countries with high, 
moderate, and limited enforcement, certain themes challenging lack 
of enforcement may be gleaned from recurring issues.  These 
include: (1) inadequate length of statute of limitations in certain 
countries according to the national implementing legislation; (2) 
lack of whistleblower protection or delayed whistleblower 
protection that renders it ineffective; (3) nonexistent or weak 
implementing legislation for national anti-bribery laws; (4) minimal 
coordination of anti-bribery efforts with national Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs or national agencies that would assist with 
combatting bribery; and  (5) weak national criminal penalties or 
monetary damages for bribery.  The following recommendations 
would strengthen national anti-bribery efforts for countries with 
currently moderate or limited enforcement measure to better align 
with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s goals. 
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5.1.  Increased Length of Statute of Limitations 
According to numerous reports of the Working Groups and 
analysis of countries with moderate or minimal success with anti-
bribery efforts, the length of the statute of limitations is an issue with 
enforcement.  Countries with very short statutes of limitation (one 
to three years) have trouble enforcing the national legislation and 
seeking out offenders who violate the anti-bribery provisions 
because it is difficult to coordinate with foreign officials during a 
short time period.288  The ideal length of time for a national statute 
of limitations in conjunction with a foreign anti-bribery statute 
would be greater than five years.  This would allow enough time to 
coordinate the action and provide mutual legal assistance to the 
additional foreign countries and their associated foreign ministries 
for appropriate prosecution of the action within the home country.289  
Overall, a statute of limitations of at least five years would be more 
similar to the U.S.’s standard in the FCPA and would provide time 
for better enforcement actions in OECD implementation nations.  
For nations that do not currently have a statute of limitations in 
place, they would need to integrate an appropriate statute of 
limitations into their implementing anti-bribery legislation. 
5.2.  Existence of Whistleblower Protection in Statutes 
The Phase 3 Working Group reports, recommendations, and 
follow-up Phase 3 critiques for nations with moderate or limited 
enforcement also highlight the importance of whistleblower 
protections.  Many instances of bribery in G20 nations are not 
investigated because interested parties do not have adequate 
whistleblower protection via national laws or have inadequate 
protection after bringing forward claims of bribery.290  Thus, 
inclusion of specific whistleblower protection in either the criminal 
statutory provisions or civil penalty provisions of anti-bribery 
legislation would be a protective measure that would facilitate 
successful prosecution.291  Accordingly, anti-bribery statistics 
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regarding national enforcement and confiscating bribery funds 
would likely improve with the integration of uniform whistleblower 
protections into national implementation legislation. 
5.3.  Formal Adoptions of Implementing Legislation and National Anti-
Bribery Laws 
The Working Group reports also revealed that countries with 
detailed implementing legislation for anti-bribery, such as the U.S.’s 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK’s Anti-Bribery Act, have 
more successful outcomes for bribery prosecution and penalties.292  
The recommendations noted that some of the moderate and limited 
enforcement G20 nations still had yet to promulgate national anti-
bribery legislation to effectuate the terms of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, and this has stalled efforts for those countries to 
prosecute bribery claims.293  Nations that are a party to the OECD 
Convention have an obligation to pass implementing legislation 
according to the preliminary articles of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention.294  Numerous nations in the international community 
are still falling short of their basic treaty obligations because they 
have not passed implementing civil or criminal national legislation 
to outline terms to combat foreign bribery in international business 
transactions.295  The Working Group’s most recent Phase 3 reports 
and follow-up reports have urged those nations without statutory 
structures for anti-bribery to quickly pass appropriate legislation or 
integrate foreign anti-bribery norms into existing legislation.296 
5.4.  Clarity of Enforcement Mechanism(s) and National Procedure 
The recommendations of the most recent Working Groups also 
illuminate the nonexistence or weakness of national administrative 
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structures for prosecuting acts of foreign bribery.297  Many of the 
countries with statistics of limited enforcement, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, or Russia, have a clear lack of infrastructure for 
coordinating prosecutions and extraditions with the appropriate 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs or internal agencies to coordinate 
prosecution of foreign bribery.298  There should be examination of 
the infrastructures and agencies within those nations to encourage 
enforcement and coordination with internal departments for better 
anti-bribery efforts.299  Furthermore, the designated agencies should 
be proactive with their internal investigations and work with other 
nations’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs to facilitate mutual legal 
assistance and penalties for international bribery according to the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s guidelines.300  Finally, 
coordination of administrative bodies in conjunction with a national 
implementing Act, such as the U.S. structure of the FCPA and the 
DOJ/SEC, is a much more successful model and encompasses the 
requirements of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
5.5.  Equality in Severity of National Penalties 
According to the most recent Working Group recommendations 
and Phase 3 reports, many nations are giving drastically different 
penalties for foreign bribery.301  The low penalties then do not deter 
the criminal actors in the international community and render the 
implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention as an ineffective 
device to combat bribery in those nations with moderate or limited 
enforcement.302  Some countries have very low fines or amounts of 
monetary penalties, such as Russia or Turkey, when juxtaposed to 
recovery of amounts confiscated in the United States, Germany, and 
Italy.303  In addition, penalties of imprisonment were vastly different 
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with little or no imprisonment in some countries and lengthy 
sentences of incarceration in other OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
countries.304  Efforts toward uniformity in recovery of foreign bribes 
in the international community and incorporation of penal 
provisions within the national implementing legislation should be 
made to better strengthen enforcement and even out the severity in 
penalties to align with the Anti-Bribery Convention’s terms.305 
6.  CONCLUSION:  TOWARDS UNIFORMITY WITH FCPA-MODELED 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AS A MODEL FOR OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION NORMS AND ENFORCEMENT 
Fighting foreign bribery on a global scale is a continued 
challenge even with the strides made through the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention for International Business Transactions and its 
national implementation in many countries.  However, the United 
States currently serves as a beacon of enforcement and provides a 
successful structure for implementing act through the FCPA and 
administrative agency structures for legitimizing enforcement.306  
The future vigorous enforcement in the United States remains 
uncertain, however, with the Trump administration and 
restructuring of leadership in administrative agencies that combat 
bribery.307  This Article should point the way toward improving 
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uniformity in combatting international bribery, though, through the 
continued use of Phase 3 reports and peer-review recommendations 
as takeaways for guidance.  The parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention should continue to heed harsh feedback, and the 
nations need to take the observations seriously to effectuate 
prosecution and coordination of mutual assistance efforts to further 
legitimize foreign anti-bribery initiatives.  The United States 
provides a model for implementing legislation through the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and current administrative coordination via 
the DOJ and SEC.  The OECD peer-review reports note the need for 
increased statute of limitations, formal protection of whistleblowers, 
clear enforcement mechanisms, facilitating passage of national 
legislation or addition to pre-existing legislation to incorporate the 
terms of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and uniformity in the 
severity of national penalties to deter bribery and confiscate funds.  
There may still be some disparities in implementation of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention terms after the most recent peer-review 
reports; however, the United States may provide a successful model 
for effective administrative structures, statutory provisions, and 
coordination with foreign governments for optimal anti-bribery 
efforts to align with the spirit of the Anti-Bribery Convention for 
future success. 
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